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I think Cathal Woods’ useful comments deserve some clarification. I divide all verbal 
activities into either mono-logues or dia-logues.1 Dia-logues comprise all interactive 
uses of language (to be precise: actual or explicit dialogues; internal or implicit 
dialogues are monological renderings of actual interactions). Based on the number 
of speakers, dia-logues – or simply interactions – are a genus that can be, quite 
straightforwardly, divided into the species of: di-logues, tri-logues, tetra-logues, etc. 
Poly-logues are dia-logues which are not di-logues. All this, in a slightly different 
way, is made clear on the first page of my paper.      
Therefore, I don’t and can’t claim or imply that “‘Many’ is implicitly defined 
as three or more, by contrast with dialogue.” First, to repeat, I don’t do it implicitly, 
but rather explicitly. Second, I consistently use a term di-logue, not a dia-logue, to 
contrast with a poly-logue. I understand that a confusion may arise for a casual 
reader for at least two reasons: 1) the tiny difference in Greek terms (dia-logue: 
through discourse; di-logue: discourse between two); 2) the practice, very deeply 
entrenched in both ordinary and academic parlance, of limiting a dia-logue to a di-
logue.2 I aim precisely to problematize this practice in argumentation theory. 
Further, Woods remarks that: 
 
In section 3, then, Lewiński offers no evidence from authority, and otherwise makes 
no theoretical case, for a polylectic; the proof will be in the pudding, that is, by 
demonstration of the existence of polylectically understood fallacies.  
 
By contrast, I think this section is precisely a theoretical case for a polylectical 
account of fallacies. I follow a path of those who, since Aristotle, have argued that a 
normative theory of argumentation can define both reasonable and fallacious 
arguments as moves in a verbal activity, a dialogue. (References are in the paper – 
whether they can be considered “evidence from authority” I don’t know. Looking at 
how argumentation theory has developed, I would say many have taken them 
seriously.) The strongest case was made by Hamblin – fallacies can be treated in an 
                                                          
1 I only take numbers into account without considering numerous value-laden concerns. E.g., 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 37) distinguish between (heuristic) dialogues=discussions and 
(eristic) debates.  
2 See a quote from Sylvan used in my paper (p. 9) and, for a further elaboration of these, the work of 
Kerbrat-Orecchionni (2004) referenced there. 
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academically satisfactory way only if there is one (unified, consistent, 
comprehensive, elegant, etc.) theory of argumentation that explains the 
fallaciousness of arguments (in the normative sense). Naturally, so many arguments 
seem fallacious to us – hence textbook taxonomies are thick. But there is typically no 
consistent theory behind detecting fallacies. Some are inferential mistakes, some 
epistemic, some ethical, some conversational, some rhetorical, etc. To avoid this 
commonsense eclecticism, Hamblin developed formal models of dialogue. Pragma-
Dialecticians, Walton & Krabbe, etc., have followed suit. All these models may seem 
contrived in their elaborate ways of justifying fallacy judgments. For of course we 
know ad hominem, false dilemma, the straw man, and so many more, are fallacies.  
I also know in some way that false dilemma is wrong (it’s ‘false’!) and that the 
straw man is too (it’s ‘straw’!). Woods seems to offer some incipient explanation of 
this; a false dilemma might be an epistemic lapse: we are myopic in considering only 
two, say, truth-candidates while there are more. (We agree that it is neither a logical 
nor a dialectical error.) However: 1) I’m not quite sure if the set of epistemic lapses 
is co-extensive with the set of what argumentation theory recognizes as fallacies; 2) 
as Woods stresses, such explanations call for some serious theoretical grounding. 
Following Hamblin – and others – I have tried to provide this grounding via the 
concept of polylogues. It’s also clear Woods departs from a logical treatment: 
 
A false dilemma essentially involves use of a false disjunction, and concludes from 
the falsity of one option that the remaining option is correct.  
 
On a standard logical reading, a false disjunction forms a tautology with a 
conjunction of false conjuncts:  ¬ (p ∨ q) ≡ ¬ p ∧ ¬ q. Hence, there is no way (other 
than a blatant illogicism) of concluding “from the falsity of one option that the 
remaining option is correct” because in a false disjunction both options are wrong 
by definition. Perhaps Woods follows here Tomić to mean an “incomplete 
disjunction”: ¬ (p ∨ q) ≡ p ∨ q (∨ n…). In this case, the valid form of disjunctive 
syllogism mentioned by Woods would indeed not work. Yet, as I have argued, this is 
not a logical sense of a false disjunction or false dilemma. Shall we be suspicious 
about incompleteness of any given premise in our logical operations? (Funny 
examples are easy to generate.) Instead, Woods again hints at epistemic criteria:  
 
[…] I don’t think that false choice [=false n-lemma, incl. di-lemma] requires even a 
dialogical analysis! It does, of course, require something more than a logical 
analysis, since it is a valid form. Argument evaluation includes evaluation of the 
premises, in addition to the logic. 
 
Yes, it does. But it is precisely this part of evaluation that does not belong to the 
competence of argumentation theory (unless we want it to be a super-theory of all 
correct knowledge). I can spot some fallacies in a nuclear physicist’s paper, but I can 
hardly check the robustness/completeness of her specialized claims qua premises. 
Following this, false dilemma/false choice would fall outside the scope of 
argumentation theory. I wouldn’t welcome this. 
